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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals from an order dismissing eight counts of false evidences of 
title and registration, a second degree felony, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
Washington County, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West2004). 
ISSUE PRESENTED, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to bind 
defendant over for trial on eight counts of making a false statement in applications 
for vehicle registration, where defendant, whose residence is located in Arizona, 
stated on the applications that his residence was located in Utah. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved below. See R. 67-68. 
Standard of review: Magistrates have "some discretion to apply the probable 
cause standard" to the facts presented at a preliminary hearing. State v. Virgin, 2006 
UT 29, Tf 34, 137 P.3d 787. "This discretion is limited, however, because in the 
bindover context a magistrate's authority to make credibility determinations is 
limited. Accordingly, an appellate court should grant commensurate limited 
deference to a magistrate's application of the bindover standard to the facts of each 
case/' Id. 
Whether the district court properly interpreted a statute is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. See State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, \ 8, 84 R3d 1171. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this appeal involves interpretation of the following statutes: 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1315. Second degree felony—False evidences of 
title and registration 
It is a second degree felony for a person with respect to a motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to: 
(1) fraudulently use a false or fictitious name in an application for 
registration, a certificate of title, or for a duplicate certificate of title; 
(2) knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a material 
fact in an application under this chapter; 
(3) otherwise commit a fraud in an application under this chapter; 
(4) alter with fraudulent intent a certificate of title, registration card, 
license plate, or permit issued by the division; 
(5) forge or counterfeit a document or license plate purporting to have 
been issued by the division; 
(6) alter, falsify, or forge an assignment upon a certificate of title; 
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(7) hold or use a document or license plate under this chapter 
knowing it has been altered, forged, or falsified; and 
(8) file an application for a certificate of title providing false lien 
information, when the person named on the application as lienholder does 
not hold a valid security interest. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-209. Application for registration — Contents 
(1) An owner of a vehicle subject to registration under this part shall 
apply to the division for registration on forms furnished by the division. 
(2) The application for registration shall include: 
(a) the signature of each owner of the vehicle to be registered; 
(b) the name, bona fide residence and mailing address of the owner, 
or business address of the owner if the owner is a firm, association, or 
corporation; 
(c) a description of the vehicle including the make, model, type of 
body, the model year as specified by the manufacturer, the number of 
cylinders, and the identification number of the vehicle; and 
(d) other information required by the division to enable it to 
determine whether the owner is lawfully entitled to register the vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with eight counts of false evidences 
of title and registration, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-
la-1315(2) (West 2004). R. 1-3. A preliminary hearing was held on 7 July 2006 and 
1 August 2006. R. 28-29,33-34. After further hearings on 11 September 2006 and 4 
October 2006, the magistrate dismissed all charges. R. 53-54,66. The dismissal was 
entered 4 October 2006. R. 67-68 (addendum A). The State timely appealed. See R. 
72, 75. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Utah-Arizona border transects the communities of Hildale, Utah, and 
Colorado City, Arizona, which are laid out on a single street grid. R. 89:30; State's 
Ex.9. 
Mark Adams, an investigator with the Office of Special Investigations of the 
Arizona Department of Economic Security, investigated welfare fraud in connection 
with approximately ten households, including defendant's, in Colorado City, 
Arizona. R. 89:19-20,29-30. In the course of his investigation, Adams located two 
addresses of record for defendant: 380 North Richard Street and 385 West Arizona 
Avenue. R. 89:21-23. The two addresses identify a single site. R. 89: 23. The site 
is located in Colorado City, Arizona, about two blocks south of the Utah border. R. 
89: 21-24. 
At various times, defendant registered eight vehicles with the Utah 
Department of Motor Vehicles. On each application he gave his address as 385 West 
Arizona Avenue or 385 North Richard Street, but he stated that this address was 
located in Hildale Utah. R. 89:11-12, 22-23,46-49; State's Ex. 1, 2, 3, 4,5, 6, 7, 8. 
It was much cheaper for defendant to register the vehicles in Utah than in 
Arizona. R. 89: 61. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The magistrate's dismissal of eight counts of false evidences of title and 
registration was error. At the preliminary hearing stage, a prosecutor need only 
establish probable cause to believe that the charged crime was committed and that 
the defendant committed it. This requires only some believable evidence of each 
element of the crime. Here, those elements were that defendant (1) knowingly (2) 
listed a false address (3) on a Utah motor vehicle registration application. The 
prosecutor presented uncontested evidence of these elements at the preliminary 
hearing. Indeed, the magistrate found that the addresses defendant represented on 
his vehicle registration applications as being in Utah were in fact in Arizona. 
The magistrate refused to bind over because the prosecution had failed to 
establish, not any element of the charge, but various non-elements. For example, in 
justifying his ruling, he noted that defendant's address could be physically located 
and that correspondence mailed to the address would reach defendant. He also 
expressed his belief that the victim of defendant's acts was the State of Arizona, not 
the State of Utah. To dismiss based on such extraneous issues is an abuse of 
discretion. The magistrate was apparently drawn off course by a 70-year-old Utah 
case construing a different subsection of the predecessor of the statute under which 
defendant was charged. The magistrate should be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT MADE FALSE STATEMENTS 
ON EIGHT VEHICLE REGISTRATION APPLICATIONS 
ESTABLISHED PROBABLE CAUSE THAT HE COMMITTED 
THE CRIME OF MAKING A FALSE STATEMENT ON A 
VEHICLE REGISTRATION APPLICATION 
The magistrate refused to bind defendant over on eight counts of giving false 
evidences of title and registration. He did so despite finding that defendant had 
made false statements on applications for Utah vehicle registration. This was error. 
Magistrate's ruling. The magistrate entered an order dismissing all eight 
counts of false evidences of title and registration. R. 67-68. He found that defendant 
registered motor vehicles in the State of Utah using addresses that accurately located 
defendant's residence and dairy on the Hildale/Colorado City grid. However, "the 
locations were identified as Hildale, Utah addresses. These addresses are, in fact, 
located in Colorado City, Arizona. Therefore, the applications for Utah registrations 
did not disclose the fact that the defendant was a resident of Arizona/7 R. 67. 
The magistrate noted that "[i]t appeared that correspondence mailed to the 
addresses provided in the registration applications would reach the defendant 
because Hildale, Utah and Colorado City, Arizona share a post office/' R. 68. He 
noted further that the investigator "had no difficulty in physically locating these 
addresses . . . . " Id. 
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The magistrate found that" defendant paid substantially less in property taxes 
and registration fees by registering the subject motor vehicles in the State of Utah 
rather than in the State of Arizona/7 Id. "However," he continued, "this court has 
no legal interest in the enforcement of the revenue-raising, regulatory, or penal 
statues of the sovereign State of Arizona." Id. 
The magistrate's order did not specify what element of the charged offense was 
unsupported by probable cause. However, he did tell the prosecutor, "I fully expect 
you to take it up . . . and let my superiors, either in the court of appeals or the 
supreme court, correct any error that I make by dismissing this matter as a matter 
of law." R.90:13. 
Sl.nuLii'tJ of review. Magistrates have "some discretion to apply the probable 
cause standard" to the facts presented at a preliminary hearing. State v. Virgin, 2006 
UT 29, If 34, 137 P.3d 787. "This discretion is limited, however, because in the 
bindover context a magistrate's authority to make credibility determinations is 
limited. Accordingly, an appellate court should grant commensurate limited 
deference to a magistrate's application of the bindover standard to the facts of each 
case." Id. The magistrate here was not called upon to make any credibility 
determinations. The facts were uncontested. 
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Bindover standard. "To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 
'probable cause7 at a preliminary hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to 
establish that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it/" State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,% 10,20 R3d 300 (quoting State v. Pledger, 
896 P.2d 1226,1229 (Utah 1995)) (additional internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). This is the sole function of the preliminary hearing. Utah Const., art. I, § 
12. "[T]o prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must . . . produce 
believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged/' Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 15 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The quantum of evidence 
necessary to support a finding of probable cause for a bindover is "relatively 
low" — the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at ^f 10,16 (additional 
internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Virgin, 2006 UT 29, \ 18. 
In applying this standard, "the magistrate must view all evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the prosecution." Clark, 2001 UT 9,110. In particular, "[k]nowledge or intent is 
a state of mind generally to be inferred from the person's conduct viewed in light 
of all the accompanying circumstances." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, j^ 10, 
988 P.2d 949 (citations omitted). 
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Analysis. The elements of the instant charge are uncomplicated. Defendant 
was charged with false evidences of title or registration under Utah Code Ann. § 41-
la-1315(2) (West 2004): 
It is a second degree felony for a person with respect to a motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to: 
(2) knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a material 
fact in an application under this chapter; 
The application referred to is the application described in Utah Code Ann. § 
41-la-209(l) (West 2004) ("An owner of a vehicle subject to registration under this 
part shall apply to the division for registration on forms furnished by the division.). 
This application must include the applicant's "bona fide residence": 
(2) The application for registration shall include: 
(b) the name, bona fide residence and mailing address of the owner, 
or business address of the owner if the owner is a firm, association, or 
corporation; 
§ 41-la-209(2)(b). Here, to bind defendant over for trial, the prosecution at 
minimum bore the burden of establishing probable cause that defendant (1) 
knowingly (2) made a false statement (3) on an application to register a motor 
vehicle in the State of Utah. The false statement defendant is charged with making 
is that his "bona fide residence" was located in Utah, whereas in fact it was located 
in Arizona. Thus, the prosecution here needed to offer some evidence that 
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defendant (1) knowingly (2) listed a false residence (3) on a Utah motor vehicle 
registration application. 
The prosecution made this showing. At the preliminary hearing, the 
prosecution presented evidence that defendant, on his vehicle registration 
application, falsely stated that his address was located in Utah. R. 89:11-12,19-23, 
46-49; State's Ex. 1,2,3,4,5, 6, 7, 8. The evidence was unchallenged, and even the 
magistrate found that the locations defendant had identified on his applications as 
Hildale, Utah addresses "are, in fact, located in Colorado City, Arizona/' R. 67. 
Thus, defendant's statement on his vehicle registration application was false. 
That defendant acted knowingly may be inferred from his "conduct viewed in 
light of all the accompanying circumstances." Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, f^ 10. 
People generally know what state they live in. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution required the magistrate to infer that defendant 
knew he resided in Arizona, not Utah. This inference is strengthened by testimony 
that an investigator for the Arizona Department of Economic Security was 
investigating defendant for welfare fraud. R. 89: 19-20, 29-30. That testimony 
suggests that defendant had claimed welfare benefits from the State of Arizona, 
demonstrating that he knew he lived in Arizona, not Utah as stated on his vehicle 
registration application. 
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Accordingly, the prosecution did produce "believable evidence of all the 
elements of the crime charged/7 Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 15 (additional internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
The magistrate identified no element of the offense that the prosecutor had left 
unsupported. Rather, he dismissed the charges because the prosecutor failed to 
prove facts that are not elements of the charged offense. For example, he noted that 
defendant's false statement did not actually conceal his whereabouts: the 
investigator "had no difficulty in physically locating these addresses" and "[i]t 
appeared that correspondence mailed to the addresses provided in the registration 
applications would reach the defendant because Hildale, Utah and Colorado City, 
Arizona share a post office." R. 68. 
In addition, the magistrate in effect determined that defendant's apparent 
motive--to evade Arizona's higher registration fees —somehow excused his 
compliance with the Utah statute: "[T]his court has no legal interest in the 
enforcement of the revenue-raising, regulatory, or penal statues of the sovereign 
State of Arizona." Id. 
The magistrate's concerns are misplaced. The State is not attempting to enforce 
an Arizona statute, but a Utah statute. The Utah Legislature has determined that the 
State of Utah has an interest in people not lying to it on vehicle registration 
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applications and has passed a statute prohibiting this conduct. That the magistrate 
would graft additional elements on to this crime, such as that the State of Utah suffer 
financial loss or that the accused intend to conceal his whereabouts, is legally 
irrelevant. Courts "'have nothing to do with what the law ought to be. [They] must 
be guided by the law as it is.'" State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 994 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting Hanchett v. Burbidge, 59 Utah 127,135, 202 P. 377,380 (1921)). 
The magistrate's confusion may be traceable in part to a misreading of State v. 
Bland, 93 Utah 384, 73 P.2d 964 (1937). That case involved the interpretation of a 
different provision of the predecessor of the statute under which defendant was 
charged. 
Herschel Bland was convicted of fraudulently using a false name in an 
application for registration of an automobile. Id. at 964. He gave his name as Bert 
Peterson. Id. He was convicted of violating section 125, article 10, chapter 46, Laws 
of Utah 1935: 
Any person who fraudulently uses a false or fictitious name in any application for 
the registration of a vehicle or a certificate of title, or knowingly makes a false 
statement or knowingly conceals a material fact or otherwise commits a 
fraud in any such application, is guilty of a felony. 
Bland, 73 P.2d at 964 (emphasis in original). The supreme court reversed his 
conviction. Its decision was based on the statutory teimfraudulent: "we do not think 
the mere use of a different name than his own makes out a prima facie case of 
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'fraudulent use of a false name/" Id. at 965 (quoting section 125, art. 10, chap. 46, 
Laws of Utah 1935). In support of this assertion, the court stated that "[m]any 
persons are better known by a stage name than by a real name." Id.1 For such a 
person to give their real name "would be more likely to throw officers off guard or 
conceal their identity." Id. Thus, "the word 'fraudulent' was inserted so that 
persons who habitually used a fixed pseudonym would not be held guilty of a 
felony." Id. Hence, the word's inclusion "must have been intended to require proof 
that defendant gave a wrong name with a bad motive, and that the mere use of a 
name other than his own does not by itself make out a prima facie case of bad 
motive . . . ." Id. Absent such proof, the court reversed Bland's conviction. Id. 
Bland does not control the case at bar, because Bland and defendant were 
charged under different statutory subsections. Bland was charged with fraudulently 
using a false or fictitious name in a vehicle registration application. See id. at 964. 
The provision at issue in that case is currently codified as subsection (1) of section 
41-la-1315. In contrast, defendant here was charged with knowingly making a false 
statement or knowingly concealing a material fact in a vehicle registration 
application. See R. 1-2. The provision at issue in this case appears as subsection (2) 
of section 41-la-1315. 
1
 The court offered no support for this curious assertion. 
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The distinction is dispositive. The supreme court's analysis in Bland hinged on 
the word fraudulently, which appears in subsection (l)'s phrase "fraudulently uses 
a false or fictitious name/' See Bland, 73 P.2d at 964. Subsection (2) does not require 
that the actor act fraudulently, merely that he "knowingly make a false statement or 
knowingly conceal a material fact." § 41-la-1315(l). Defendant did that. 
To follow Bland here would require this Court to read the wordfraudulently into 
subsection (2) — "to insert... a substantive [term] by judicial fiat." State v. Wallace, 
2006 UT 86,19,150 P.3d 540 (quoting Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, \ 16,133 P.3d 
370) (insertion in original). This is not the court's role. As our supreme court 
recently stated, "Our task is to interpret the words used by the legislature, not to 
correct or revise them. When the words are clear, however incongruous they may 
appear in policy application, we will interpret them as written, leaving to the 
legislature the task of making corrections when warranted." Id. The role of the 
judicial branch is to enforce the statute, not "the policy behind the statute." Paul, 860 
P.2d at 994. 
The State adduced believable evidence of all the elements of the Utah statute 
under which defendant was charged. The magistrate never found otherwise, and 
nothing more was required. Accordingly, defendant should have been bound over 
for trial on the charged counts. 
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CONCLUSION 
The magistrate's order of dismissal should be reversed, the charges against 
defendant reinstated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18, Tf 10,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the 
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,560 (Cal. 
1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral 
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on March 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
C VOROS, JR. 
stant Attorney General 
:
, Appeals Division 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that this \£i March 2007, ^ copies of the foregoing brief of 
appellee were • hand-delivered to an agent of ^mailed to the following: 
GARY W. PENDLETON 
301 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee 
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Addendum A 
Gary W. Pendleton (USB No. 02564) 
Attorney for Defendant 
301 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Ph: (435)628-7086 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERRUX C. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DISMISSING 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 061500552 FS 
Judge James L. Shumate 
From the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing conducted herein, it was 
apparent that the defendant, while a resident of Colorado City, Arizona, registered certain motor 
vehicles in the State of Utah using addresses on West Arizona Avenue and North Juniper Street. 
While the addresses provided on the Utah registration applications accurately located the 
defendant's residence and Meadowayne Dairy on the Hildale/Colorado City grid, the locations 
were identified as Hildale, Utah addresses. These addresses are, in fact, located in Colorado 
City, Arizona. Therefore, the applications for Utah registrations did not disclose the fact that the 
defendant was a resident of Arizona. 
1 
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It appeared that correspondence mailed to the addresses provided in the 
registration applications would reach the defendant because Hildale, Utah and Colorado City, 
Arizona share a post office. Furthermore, the persons how investigated this matter had no 
difficulty in physically locating these addresses after driving the streets of Hildale, Utah and 
Colorado City, Arizona. 
The defendant paid substantially less in property taxes and registration fees by 
registering the subject motor vehicles in the State of Utah rather than in the State of Arizona. 
However, this court has no legal interest in the enforcement of the revenue-raising, regulatory, or 
penal statutes of the sovereign State of Arizona. 
The court, having reviewed the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, 
having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, made the 
following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Information charging the defendant, Terrill C. 
Johnson, with eight counts of the offense of FALSE EVIDENCES OF TITLE AND 
REGISTRATION, a Second Degree Felony, is DISMISSED. 
U G ^ 
DATED this H day of September, 2006. 
JanjeSX. Shumate 
Approved as to form and content: District Court Judge 
Wayne Caldwell 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this day of September, 2006,1 did personally deliver 
or cause to be delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DISMISSING 
INFORMATION to Wayne Caldwell at the Washington County Attorney's Office, 178 North 
200 East, Saint George, Utah 84770. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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